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BIAS AND IMMIGRATION: A NEW FACTORS TEST TO
EXAMINE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF ANIMUS IN
IMMIGRATION CASES†
ABSTRACT
Courts have historically struggled to consistently consider extrinsic
evidence of animus and bias in immigration cases. In two key cases concerning
challenges to restrictive immigration policies of the Trump Administration—
Trump v. Hawaii and DHS v. Regents of the University of California—the
Supreme Court shied away from considering numerous examples of former
President Trump’s discriminatory rhetoric and public comments of religious
and racial animus that would challenge the constitutionality of the policies.
Instead, the Court invoked the historically prominent deference to the executive
branch’s immigration power and to the interest in national security. However,
the Court’s quick dismissal of extrinsic evidence of biased comments departs
from compelling legal precedent. In multiple previous cases concerning
immigration and other matters, courts have looked beyond the record at public
statements made by high-ranking government officials involved in the
promulgation of policies that became the subject of legal challenges. Thus,
courts’ inability to consider extrinsic evidence of animus stemming from former
President Trump exposes a weakness in the existing legal analytical framework
and suggests the need for an alternative test. Deference to national security
should not justify excluding entire categories of evidence that may reveal the
unconstitutionality of an immigration law.
To address these shortcomings, this Comment proposes a new factors test to
assist courts in considering how much weight to give to external statements of
bias and animus in immigration cases. Courts should weigh five key factors: (1)
the identity of the speaker, (2) the temporal proximity between the biased
statement and the challenged government action, (3) the scope of the statement’s
entry in the public sphere, (4) the frequency of the statements, and (5) whether
a reasonable observer would view the government action as enacted because of
animus toward a particular protected class. In a post-Trump era where
unbridled political rhetoric has been normalized, use of this new test will allow
courts to deal with overt statements of bias more consistently and avoid
upholding discriminatory immigration policies under the guise of national
security.
†

Writing.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts have struggled to consistently deal with external evidence of bias and
animus.1 This inconsistency poses a unique risk in the context of immigration
law. In ruling on immigration policies, courts must balance deference to the
executive branch’s immigration power and to national security, with protecting
against unlawful discrimination and other constitutional violations.2 This
balancing act was proven problematic and inadequate when, against the
backdrop of divisive, discriminatory rhetoric from the executive,3 courts were
faced with constitutional challenges to the Trump Administration’s harsh
immigration policies.4
In cases concerning the constitutionality of the Trump Administration’s
immigration policies, the Supreme Court departed from precedent in failing to
1
Compare, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (considering the Secretary of
Commerce’s statements of racial bias to hold a gerrymandering effort violated the Fourteenth Amendment), with
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (declining to consider the President’s statements of bias against
Muslims to uphold the travel ban).
2
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3
See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 5, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 16-1540), 2017
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3420, at *16 (citing President Trump’s campaign promises for “a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); DHS v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1917 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing
President Trump’s declarations that Mexican nationals are “people that have lots of problems” and “criminals,
drug dealers [and] rapists”).
4
For example, these policies included the “zero tolerance” policy for undocumented immigrants who
crossed the border, a ban on the entry of foreign nationals from seven Muslim-majority nations, the end to
Temporary Protected Status program for nationals from various countries, the rescission of the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals program and a new harsher public charge rule for green card applicants. Jeff Sessions,
Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Remarks Discussing the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the Trump
Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarksdiscussing-immigration-enforcement-actions; Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Press
Release, Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Announcement on Temporary Protected Status
for Haiti (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/11/20/acting-secretary-elaine-duke-announcementtemporary-protected-status-haiti; Press Release, Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for El Salvador (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/
01/08/secretary-homeland-security-kirstjen-m-nielsen-announcement-temporary-protected; Press Release,
Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for
Honduras (May 4, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/05/04/secretary-homeland-security-kirstjen-m-nielsenannouncement-temporary-protected; Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA), Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Sec’y (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2017/09/05/rescission-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca; Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83
Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103). The Biden Administration has
signaled its intent to reverse many of these policies. See Press Release, White House Briefing Room, Fact Sheet:
President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernize Our Immigration
System (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheetpresident-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-ourimmigration-system/.
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consider evidence of bias, animus, and prejudice from the executive and other
high-ranking government actors involved in the promulgation of the laws at
issue—evidence that undermines constitutionality. In Trump v. Hawaii,5 the
case concerning former President Trump’s Muslim travel ban, the Supreme
Court ignored the former President’s public statements made on Twitter and on
the campaign trail that demonstrated an anti-Muslim animus and quickly
dismissed the statements as extrinsic evidence that need not be considered.6
Similarly, in DHS v. Regents of the University of California,7 the Court ignored
former President Trump’s public statements when it dismissed an Equal
Protection claim.8 However, this treatment of extrinsic evidence is inconsistent
with the Court’s practice both in other immigration-related cases9 as well as in
cases from other areas of the law.10 Furthermore, many lower courts have
grappled with such evidence of the executive’s publicly-made and publiclyavailable statements of bias and animus instead of shying away and ignoring
them.11 Although certain statements may seem clear to the general public as
indicative of prejudice toward a certain class of people grouped by race,
nationality, or gender, courts have struggled to deal with such explicit
indications of bias in a consistent manner, particularly in the context of
immigration. As divisive rhetoric becomes more pervasive and publicly
normalized, a new test is needed to ensure that a national security justification
only protects immigration policies that are constitutional.
To address this inconsistency, this Comment argues for the adoption of a
new factors test to help courts determine whether to consider the public
statements of high-ranking government officials in immigration cases
concerning constitutional issues. This Comment builds upon the holistic factors
specified by the Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation,12 which include (1) the decision’s historical
background, (2) the “sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,”
(3) the departure from normal procedure, and (4) the “legislative or

5

138 S. Ct. 2392.
Id. at 2412, 2418, 2420.
7
140 S. Ct. 1891.
8
Id. at 1915–16.
9
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
10
See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
11
See, e.g., Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Ramos
v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
12
429 U.S. 252.
6
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administrative history.”13 There is also a compelling reason to consider such
statements when the public would reasonably understand the statements to be
biased.14 Thus, courts should carefully consider frequent, public statements
made by high-ranking government actors closely involved in the matter at issue.
Although courts afford great deference to the executive in matters of national
security and immigration, this deference should not automatically disqualify the
consideration of extrinsic evidence of animus in constitutional cases when a
compelling reason to do so exists.
Before turning to the implementation of the new factors test, this Comment
provides a background in immigration law, constitutional issues, and the
existing methods of analysis courts have used in similar cases. First, Part I
reviews relevant principles of immigration, constitutional, and administrative
law. Part I.A examines the history of immigration law and the judiciary’s
deference to both national security and the executive’s immigration power. Next,
Part I.B turns to the existing standards for constitutional cases concerning the
Equal Protection and the Establishment Clauses of the Constitution and
administrative cases under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).15 Part II
reviews the doctrine of animus, evidence law, and the administrative record. Part
III reviews various cases from before and during the Trump Administration in
which courts considered statements of bias or prejudice, and then juxtaposes
these precedents with the Supreme Court’s minimal treatment of biased
statements in Trump v. Hawaii and DHS v. Regents of the University of
California. In Part IV, this Comment argues that although the Supreme Court
has developed two lines of precedent, the Court’s recent treatment of evidence
of bias as “extrinsic” is inconsistent with the more compelling precedent and
that, instead, courts should employ a new factors test to more thoroughly
evaluate explicit statements of bias when such statements are sufficiently
relevant, clear, and public. Finally, Part V reviews the implications on law and
policy that arise from employing this test.
I.

BACKGROUND ON IMMIGRATION, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Because this Comment analyzes cases that consider challenges to different
rights in the broad realm of immigration law, the contextualization of

13
14
15

Id. at 267–68; see infra notes 214–217.
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 550–596.
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immigration and constitutional law is necessary to understand what tools and
backdrops courts have when evaluating immigration cases.
A. Immigration Law, Deference, and National Security
A common refrain is that the United States is a nation of immigrants.16 While
it is true that this country was founded by settlers who left Great Britain and
elsewhere, the United States is also a nation of immigration regulation. Since its
founding, the country has been regulating immigration17—controlling who may
permissibly enter and restricting who may naturalize to become citizens.
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the express authority to “establish a[]
uniform [r]ule of [n]aturalization.”18 As a result, Congress has regulated
immigration throughout history depending on the contemporaneous political,
social, and demographic trends. In 1790, Congress enacted a law that made
naturalization available only to “free white person[s]” who had resided in the
United States for two years and who demonstrated “good character.”19 Eight
years later, the Alien and Sedition Acts afforded sweeping powers to the
government to remove aliens who were deemed to pose a threat to the safety of
the country.20 Over the next century, as more immigrants from Asia came to the
United States and were viewed as a threat, Congress responded by barring the
entry of Chinese,21 Japanese,22 and other Asian23 nationals. It was not until the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that Congress repealed the Japanese
exclusion policy.24 Today, United States immigration law is governed by the
1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),25 which contains preference

16
See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (“[W]e have often been described as a ‘nation
of immigrants.’”); JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964).
17
D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through History, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-havechanged-through-history/.
18
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
19
An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
20
Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798) (expired June 25, 1800); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66,
1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–23 (1999)); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired
Mar. 3, 1801).
21
See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
22
See Immigration (Johnson-Reed) Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (also imposing
annual quotas of two percent of the number of foreign-born individuals of a given nationality residing in the
United States).
23
Immigration (Literacy) Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917).
24
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
25
Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Celler) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2020)).
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categories for family-based,26 employment-based,27 and diversity28
immigration, as well as provisions for humanitarian immigrants such as
refugees29 and asylees.30
An overview of the history of immigration law sheds light on how the
executive and legislative branches get broad deference in exercising the
immigration power. This deference is exemplified in judicial decisions31 as well
as in broader legal discourse. For example, immigration law has been
characterized as “exceptional” in the eyes of the courts and as having not yet
gone through a process of “normalization” by which courts treat these issues the
same as any other legal issue.32 This concept of exceptionalism illustrates that
there is something unique about immigration law, making it different even from
other foreign relations questions.33 Furthermore, courts have historically viewed
the power to expel and to regulate the entry of non-citizens as central to the
concept of sovereignty.34 Because the power to regulate immigration is inherent
to a sovereign nation, courts give substantial deference to the exercise of such
power.
Another reason that the judiciary affords deference to immigration law is
because of national security.35 Use of national security rhetoric to regulate
immigration is particularly common in moments of war when racialized
assumptions prompt crisis responses.36 The most notable example is Korematsu
v. United States,37 which reached the Supreme Court in 1944 and is considered
part of the American anticanon of cases that are now considered wrongly
26

See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A).
See § 1153(b).
28
See § 1153(c).
29
See § 1101(a)(42) (defining “refugee”).
30
See § 1158.
31
See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (recognizing “the power to expel or exclude aliens
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from
judicial control”).
32
Mac LeBuhn, The Normalization of Immigration Law, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 91, 92 (2017).
33
Id.
34
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889) (“The
inherent right of a sovereign power to prohibit, even in time of peace, the entry into its territories of the subjects
of a foreign state will not be denied.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (“It is an
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions.”).
35
See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (citations omitted) (“National-security policy is the
prerogative of the Congress and President. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises ‘concerns for
the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches.’”).
36
Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1834 (2007).
37
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27
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decided.38 In Korematsu, the Court upheld a wartime Japanese exclusion order
against a challenge by a citizen of Japanese descent who was convicted for
violating the order.39 The Court reasoned that Korematsu was excluded not
because of “hostility to him or his race” but rather because “we are at war with
the Japanese Empire.”40 Although this decision is widely regarded as one of the
Court’s “most egregious failures,”41 it was not overturned until seventy-five
years later.42 The case remains as a chilling reminder of the extent to which
national security will overshadow even the rights of citizens in times of war.43
More recently, after September 11, 2001, Congress’s and the President’s
immigration power became wrapped up in the goal of combating terrorism in
the interest of national security.44 After 9/11, discourse around liberal
immigration reform came to a halt and instead efforts focused on ensuring public
safety and “seal[ing] the borders.”45 The focus on national security even went so
far as to limit the civil rights of non-citizens, citizens, and minorities.46 For
example, when the Department of Justice detained hundreds of men following
9/11, one of the men, Javaid Iqbal (who was later deported), filed a federal
lawsuit alleging mistreatment on the basis of race and national origin and also
38
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 381, 422–27 (2011) (arguing that anticanonical
status “depends on the attitude the constitutional interpretive community takes toward the ethical propositions
that the decision has come to represent”).
39
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–16, 223.
40
Id. at 223.
41
John Ip, The Travel Ban, Judicial Deference, and the Legacy of Korematsu, 63 HOW. L.J. 153, 153
(2020); see also Greene, supra note 38, at 381, 399–400 (noting that most of the then-recent Supreme Court
nominees stated that Korematsu was wrongly decided and that a district court later vacated Korematsu’s
conviction).
42
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“The dissent’s reference to Korematsu, however,
affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the
day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has no place in law under the
Constitution.’”).
43
See Tania Cruz, Judicial Scrutiny of National Security: Executive Restrictions of Civil Liberties when
“Fears and Prejudices are Aroused,” 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 129, 129–31 (2003) (arguing for more rigorous
judicial review to check executive restrictions that limit civil liberties in times of war such as in Korematsu and
in post-9/11 United States).
44
See, e.g., MICHELLE MITTELSTADT, BURKE SPEAKER, DORIS MEISSNER & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI,
THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE
DECADE SINCE 9/11 (2011), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/FS23_Post-911policy.pdf. After 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was dissolved and in its place the
Department of Homeland Security was formed with a focus on combating terrorism and removing criminal
foreign nationals. Post 9/11, USCIS.GOV, https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/post-911 (last updated
Dec. 4, 2019).
45
Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and
the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1370–71, 1373 (2007) (arguing that post9/11 national security concerns “distorted” the debate over immigration reform).
46
Id. at 1369–70.
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alleging various abuses from his time in detention.47 The Supreme Court shied
away from the issue, holding that the pleadings were insufficient.48 This
avoidance demonstrates that the concept of national security, particularly in
times of war, conflict, and external threats, justifies the judicial deference
afforded to the President’s and Congress’s exercise of the immigration power.49
Despite this broad deference afforded to immigration authority in the interest
of national security, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the political
branches’ efforts to make immigration law and policy are still subject to
constitutional review.50 Although Congress has plenary authority over
immigration, which is “not open to question,”51 courts can and do ensure that
“the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional
restriction.”52 Indeed, the Court has never held that the judiciary “lack[s] the
authority to review executive action[s]” concerning immigration or national
security issues to ensure they comply with the Constitution.53 Therefore, the
deference afforded to the judicial branches in the realm of immigration law and
policy ends, or at least is curtailed, when constitutional and administrative law
issues arise. The delicate balance between judicial deference and Congress’s
decision-making authority is a longstanding theme that has pervaded the judicial
system for centuries,54 but that inherent tension is perhaps more salient in issues
of the political branches’ exercise of their immigration power.
The amount of deference that the political branches will receive in the
exercise of their immigration authority depends on the type of immigration that

47
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Iqbal and Race: Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security
Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (2010); Complaint, Elmaghraby, No. 04-1809 (E.D.N.Y. May
3, 2004).
48
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (holding that a complaint must contain “sufficient factual
matter” to have “facial plausibility” and conclusory allegations are insufficient).
49
See Cruz, supra note 43, at 130 (“[D]uring times of national security fears, the judiciary often embraces
the executive’s arguments of minimal judicial review and fails to closely scrutinize government national security
actions.”).
50
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that Congress’s plenary power to create
immigration law “is subject to important constitutional limitations”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983)
(affirming that Congress must chose a “constitutionally permissible means of implementing [its plenary]
power”).
51
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940.
52
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), as recognized in Ams. for Prosperity v. Grewal, No. 3:19-cv14228, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170793, at *47–48 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2019).
53
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017).
54
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
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is being addressed or regulated. Some of the key distinctions in immigration law
revolve around questions of geographic location and admissibility.55 Courts
afford more rights to plaintiffs who are physically located inside the United
States than those who are outside of the country’s borders.56 Non-citizens who
have not been admitted to the United States have “no constitutional right of entry
to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.”57 Furthermore, foreign
nationals deemed inadmissible are ineligible to receive visas or enter the country
lawfully.58 Courts are hesitant to second-guess the decisions of officials who
grant or deny a foreign national’s application to enter or gain admission to the
United States.59
Thus, the history of immigration law in the United States demonstrates the
judiciary’s strong deference to the political branches’ exercise of their authority
to regulate immigration. In the interests of national security and ensuring the
safety and sovereignty of the country, courts have upheld laws and policies that
discriminate against non-citizens and citizens alike.60 Although courts still assert
their judicial role in reviewing the constitutionality of such immigration policies,
an overall policy of deference has allowed courts to uphold some of the most
insidious and discriminatory laws in this nation’s history. These themes of
judicial deference, broad immigration authority to exclude and deport, and
national security provide a backdrop to understanding how courts struggle to
evaluate constitutional issues in immigration policies that are alleged to be
discriminatory.

55
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (providing that foreign nationals who are inadmissible “are ineligible to receive
visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States”). Compare § 1255(a) (providing that foreign nationals
who were “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the United States may apply for adjustment of status on the
basis of a family petition if they are “admissible”), with § 1201(a) (stating that foreign nationals who were not
admitted into the country or who are located abroad must apply for their visas abroad at the consulate through
the Department of State).
56
Compare Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893) (recognizing that Chinese noncitizens residing and domiciled in the United States are entitled to constitutional safeguards), with Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (upholding the denial of a visa to a foreign journalist who was deemed
inadmissible).
57
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762.
58
8 U.S.C. § 1182.
59
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to expel or
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely
immune from judicial control.’”).
60
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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B. Standards in Constitutional and Administrative Cases
Many of the cases concerning the Trump Administration’s immigration
policies revolved around constitutional issues (specifically, Equal Protection or
Establishment Clause issues), administrative procedure issues, or both.61 A
review of these different areas of the law is critical to examine the existing
standards employed by courts and to understand how courts could incorporate
the analysis of statements of bias while still adhering to these precedents.
Although constitutional and administrative issues may be quite distinct in many
regards, the juxtaposition of the varying issues at play in the immigration context
illustrates how both the constitutional and administrative legal precedents
employ frameworks that consider only certain types of evidence. Consequently,
in many types of cases, courts may have room to ignore other compelling
evidence of bias because of convenience, deference, or hesitation.
1. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“[n]o [s]tate shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”62 This proclamation of equal treatment applies not only
to citizens in the United States—it applies universally “to all persons within
territorial jurisdiction” of the country.63 The Clause applies to citizens, residents,
and foreign nationals, and it also applies regardless of whether they may have
unlawful presence or not. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has stated, “the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”64
However, scholars debate over competing visions of the constitutional meaning
of equality. While some view equality as rooted in an antisubordination
principle, whereby the state should not enforce inferior status on historically
marginalized groups, others view equality through the lens of anticlassification
in that individuals, not groups, are protected.65 Under either view, the
Constitution guarantees that every person physically present in the United States
be treated equally by the state either to protect the individual or the classified
group.

61
See DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1897 (2020) (APA and Equal Protection);
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018) (INA and Establishment Clause).
62
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
63
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
64
Id.
65
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004).
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When evaluating an Equal Protection claim, courts examine whether the law
or state action at issue treated different classes of people differently.66 When
treating two classes of persons differently, the government’s actions are
subjected to varying standards of judicial scrutiny depending on the type of
classification. The first type—classifications based on race,67 nationality,68 and
alienage69—receives strict scrutiny, the highest form of judicial review, under
which the law at issue must be “narrowly tailored” to further a “compelling”
state interest.70 These classifications get the most stringent form of judicial
scrutiny and the outcomes are more favorable to the individual plaintiffs because
race and nationality are suspect classes.71 The presumption supporting
heightened scrutiny here is that “discrete and insular minorities” will be less able
to protect themselves and consequently should be designated a suspect class.72
Strict scrutiny is also proper when the contested government action “impinge[s]
upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’”73 Government actions that classify
based on race may be facially discriminatory or facially neutral.74 When a law
is facially neutral, courts invoke strict scrutiny if there is both a discriminatory
purpose and a discriminatory effect.75 The party alleging the Equal Protection
violation “has the burden of proving” the state action had a discriminatory
purpose.76 A showing of discriminatory effects is insufficient on its own to
subject a facially neutral law to strict scrutiny.77

66
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (stating that the doctrine of Equal Protection ensures that
similarly situated people “are treated alike[,] are subject to the same restrictions, and are entitled to the same
privileges under similar conditions”).
67
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (asserting that racial classifications are
“immediately suspect” and subject to the “most rigid scrutiny”).
68
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnotes omitted) (“[C]lassifications based on
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”).
69
See id. (citation omitted) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority
for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”).
70
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
71
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216
(“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”).
72
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
73
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982).
74
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886))
(“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
race.”).
75
See id. at 240 (“[T]he basic equal protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”).
76
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
77
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238–39.
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Second, classifications based on sex,78 gender,79 and children of unmarried
parents80 receive intermediate scrutiny, whereby the means of classification
must be “substantially related” to an “important” government interest to survive
this review.81 Finally, all other classifications—such as those based on age,82
disability,83 wealth,84 and non-marital families85—are subject to rational basis
review, whereby the law at issue must be “rationally related to [a] legitimate
government” interest.86 The amount of deference a court will afford to the
government depends on which standard of judicial scrutiny is proper to the
classification at issue. For example, rational basis review affords the most
deference to the government actor, tolerating “imperfect fit[s] between means
and ends”87 and substantial over- and under-inclusiveness of the law at issue.88
2. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution
declares that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”89 Although the First Amendment does not include a “textual definition
of ‘establishment,’ and the term is . . . not self-defining,”90 the Supreme Court
has understood the clause to prohibit the government from officially preferring
one religion over another.91 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court established three

78

See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
80
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (per curiam) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a statute
of limitations for paternity actions).
81
Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
82
See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
requiring mandatory retirement of state police at age fifty was “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest”).
83
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (“To withstand equal protection
review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.”), superseded by statute, Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988).
84
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (concluding that a school finance
system based on local property tax collection did not disadvantage a suspect class).
85
See USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (holding the “unrelated person” provision of the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 failed rational basis review).
86
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981).
87
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
88
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979). The Constitution also provides for equal protection in
the Fifth Amendment, whereby discriminatory legislation by Congress may amount to a denial of due process.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]”); Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337–38 (1943).
89
U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
90
McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874–75 (2005).
91
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is
79
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“tests” or “cumulative criteria” that a statute must satisfy to avoid a violation of
this Clause.92 The Court enumerated, “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the statute must not foster
‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”93 In this test, “purpose
matters”: “[m]anifesting a purpose to favor one faith over another, or adherence
to religion generally, clashes with the ‘understanding . . . that liberty and social
stability demand a religious tolerance that respects the religious views of all
citizens[.]’”94
Consequently, the overarching theme of the analysis of the Establishment
Clause—and of the First Amendment as a whole—is the principle of
government neutrality.95 A government act that has the “ostensible and
predominant purpose of advancing religion” thus violates the Establishment
Clause and its principle of neutrality.96 The government must adhere to the
neutrality principle and cannot pass a law with the purpose of preferring one
religion over another. The Lemon test provides courts with guidance for
evaluating an Establishment Clause challenge.
3. Administrative Procedure Act
In addition to the constitutional issues revolving around the Equal Protection
Clause and the Establishment Clause, immigration cases often involve issues of
administrative law. Administrative law is common in these cases because much
of immigration rulemaking and guidance comes from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and its promulgation of regulatory actions.97 DHS
also houses numerous other agencies in charge of other aspects of immigration
in the United States, including enforcement and admission.98
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”).
92
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
93
Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
94
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860, 866 n.14 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
95
Id. (citation omitted) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being
no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”).
96
Id.
97
See DHS Rulemaking, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-rulemaking.
98
Agencies housed in DHS include U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). Id. The agencies in charge of administering deportation and other immigration court
proceedings are housed in the Department of Justice and include the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.

GALVEZ_10.5.21

2021]

10/5/2021 10:16 AM

BIAS AND IMMIGRATION

71

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the procedural
framework for agency decision-making.99 The APA allows for formal and
informal notice and comment rulemaking100 and formal adjudication.101 Under
notice and comment rulemaking, DHS must provide advanced notice in the
Federal Registrar of the proposed rule’s legal authority and either the terms or
substance of the rule or a description of the issues involved.102 The agency must
also allow interested parties an opportunity to comment and must engage in
“meaningful review”103 to respond to and address material comments.104 Finally,
the agency incorporates in the final rule “a concise general statement of [the
rule’s] basis and purpose.”105 While rulemaking is proper for future-oriented
rules that could affect many people, adjudication is the proper process for pastoriented rulemaking that affects a specific entity or incident.106 The rules that
DHS promulgates in accordance with the APA are binding and have the force of
law.107
When courts review an agency’s final action that was expressly delegated
by Congress, the standard of review is arbitrary or capricious.108 The APA
instructs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”109 Under this standard, the agency must
“examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’”110 Even if the government actor acted within the scope of his authority,

justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last updated Feb. 3, 2021); Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last updated Aug. 31, 2021).
99
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 550–596.
100
§ 553.
101
§§ 556–557.
102
§ 553(b).
103
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977).
104
§ 553(c).
105
Id.
106
§ 551(5), (7).
107
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (declaring that
agency regulations, when filling a gap left open by Congress implicitly or explicitly for the agency to fill, “are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).
108
§ 706(2)(A).
109
Id.
110
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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the reviewing court must still determine whether there has been a “clear error of
judgment.”111 The Supreme Court has elaborated on the review process,
explaining the following:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.112

However, in examining these factors, a court should not overstep its role as a
reviewing court and substitute its judgment for the agency.113 For example, a
reviewing court should not offer a reasoned basis for the agency’s action if the
agency itself did not give such a reason.114 Therefore, a reviewing court still
affords some deference to the agency in making its determination under the
arbitrary or capricious standard.115
The APA’s procedures for agency rulemaking and guidance for reviewing
courts in examining agency action apply in the immigration context to DHS
actions of notice and comment rulemaking and review of its actions.116 In
addition to the constitutional issues covered in the preceding section, plaintiffs,
when challenging a new rule or published policy, can allege that a DHS
rulemaking action was arbitrary or capricious in violation of the APA.117
Although different standards apply for a reviewing court that examines an
agency’s action under either the Constitution or the APA, both occur frequently
in the immigration context.118
II. HOW COURTS EXAMINE EVIDENCE OF ANIMUS AND BIAS
The animus doctrine119 in Equal Protection cases is well established through
case law concerning classifications of race and nationality, which receive strict
111

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. (“[The Court] will, however, ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned.’”).
116
See DHS Rulemaking, supra note 97.
117
See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
118
See, e.g., DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018).
119
See generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017)
112
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scrutiny.120 Recently, however, instances of explicit bias by high-ranking
government officials, such as former President Trump, present courts with
challenges in how much weight and determinative effect to give such
evidence.121 A review of the animus doctrine, evidence law, and historical cases
where the adjudicating courts considered extrinsic evidence of bias or other
motives suggests that new guidelines are necessary to maintain consistency
across courts and throughout history.
A. Bias and Animus
Under rational basis review for potential Equal Protection violations, the
animus doctrine provides for an additional inquiry. The animus doctrine comes
into play in the first step of rational basis review when courts ask whether the
law at issue is addressing a legitimate government interest.122 When the
predominant motivation of government action is animus towards a certain group,
courts hold that such a purpose is not a legitimate government interest.123 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has noted that “if the constitutional conception of ‘equal
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest.”124 Consequently, in this context “animus” means just
that—“a bare desire . . . to harm a politically unpopular group.”125 Once animus
is shown, unless the government can provide another, independent purpose not
based in animus, it is very difficult for the government to prevail.126 Although
courts generally afford a large amount of deference to the government actors in
rational basis review, cases falling under the animus doctrine are not given such
deference if the only purpose for the government action was animus or bias
towards the affected group. Because courts evaluate government actions
differently when they are motivated by animus, scholars have given this type of
(explaining that when the government acts on the basis of animus or bias, its act is categorically unconstitutional
and impermissible).
120
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
121
See, e.g., DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392.
122
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985).
123
See id. at 450 (holding that a Texas zoning ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
“rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36
(1996) (holding that a Colorado law prohibiting homosexuals from obtaining protection lacked a legitimate
government interest); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (holding that a federal food stamp
program’s purpose to discriminate against hippies and hippie communes was not a legitimate government
interest).
124
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
125
Id.
126
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (striking down a law that was “inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class it affect[ed]”); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535.

GALVEZ_10.5.21

74

10/5/2021 10:16 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:57

review numerous other names, including “rational basis with bite,”127 “rational
basis with teeth,”128 and “rational basis plus.”129
One issue that remains largely unresolved in cases involving the animus
doctrine is how courts should treat implicit biases compared to explicit biases.130
The Supreme Court has stated that “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”131 Although
private, hidden, or implicit biases may be difficult to detect, courts will consider
such biases in conducting rational basis with bite review.132 However, some
scholars argue that the animus doctrine has failed to properly detect or deal with
all types of bias. Jessica Clarke, a professor at Vanderbilt Law School, has
examined how courts have modified discrimination doctrines to ignore incidents
of explicit bias.133 In her article Explicit Bias, Clarke argues that “[d]octrines
that would shield evidence of explicit bias from consideration in discrimination
cases should be rejected.”134 She defines the term “explicit bias” to have a
broader meaning than animus and to mean “what a reasonable listener could
consider to be views about the attributes of a particular group.”135
In her article, Clarke cites examples of when courts disregard evidence of
discriminatory purposes. These include when the contested laws are facially
neutral;136 when government officials intended the enacted law to achieve other
nondiscriminatory ends, such as national security, controlling crime, or winning
elections;137 when judges express concern for the parties accused of
discrimination;138 and in the stray remarks doctrine in employment law.139

127
E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 536 (1997); Gayle Lynn
Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759 (2011).
128
E.g., Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 540 (2014); Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 488 n.5 (1998).
129
E.g., Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135 n.5 (2011).
130
See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U.L. REV. 505, 509 (2018).
131
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
132
See, e.g., id. (striking down a zoning ordinance as applied to a disabled home because property owners’
animus toward the disabled is not a permissible basis for different treatment).
133
Clarke, supra note 130, at 510.
134
Id. at 507.
135
Id. at 513–14.
136
Id. at 523.
137
See id.
138
Id. at 539.
139
Id. at 542–47 (“[T]he stray remarks doctrine enables courts to altogether exclude explicit bias from
consideration in employment discrimination cases.”).
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Clarke argues that in these instances, courts often ignore examples of explicit
bias unless such bias manifests so clearly as “naked animus”140 that it cannot be
ignored. She juxtaposes two Equal Protection cases that reached the Supreme
Court—Palmer v. Thompson141 and Trump v. Hawaii142—to exemplify how
courts’ failure to consider evidence of explicit bias arising from facially neutral
laws “eviscerate[s] the potential for [sic] equal protection doctrine to protect
minorities.”143
Clarke maintains that legal scholarship’s and courts’ failure to consider
evidence of explicit bias has dangerous consequences.144 She asserts that “[t]he
legitimation of explicitly biased attitudes may therefore increase the prevalence
of discrimination and further entrench inequality.”145 Through this
legitimization process, doctrines that shield consideration of such explicit biases,
in the context of Equal Protection and in other contexts, cause discriminatory
beliefs to become “self-fulfilling prophecies.”146 Finally, Clarke also rebuts four
counterarguments against considering such evidence, arguing instead that (1)
“[u]nofficial remarks may be . . . reliable evidence,” (2) courts should recognize
bias rather than turning a “blind eye” out of fear of judicial overreach, (3) “the
threat to free expression” posed by her approach must be balanced against the
“interest[] in enforcing equality law,” and (4) “[t]he risk of backlash should also
be assessed against the harms of condoning explicit bias.”147
Clarke’s article illustrates the shortcomings of courts’ hesitance to consider
evidence of explicit bias and warns against the broader policy and social
implications of continued judicial ignorance of such evidence.148 While Clarke
examined cases concerning Equal Protection, employment law, and other issues,
legal scholars have examined the animus doctrine in other specific contexts. For
example, in a recent article, Megan Mallamas reviewed the tension between the
animus doctrine and the judicial deference afforded to the executive branch’s
actions in Trump v. Hawaii.149 Mallamas suggested that the Supreme Court in
140

Id. at 539.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
142
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
143
Clarke, supra note 130, at 530.
144
Id. at 516 (“When discrimination is explicit, it has material and expressive harms that are intertwined.”).
145
Id. at 522–23.
146
Id. at 523.
147
Id. at 511–12.
148
Id. at 510 (“These cases deserve attention not only because they deny justice to individual victims of
discrimination but also because the failure to confront explicit forms of discrimination may normalize
prejudice.”).
149
Megan L. Mallamas, American Animus: Where Trump v. Hawaii Leaves the Animus Doctrine Today,
42 CAMPBELL L. REV. 139 (2020).
141
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Trump v. Hawaii inconsistently followed the precedent of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center because “[i]f a law that discriminated against a small
group as a result of unsubstantiated fear for the community’s safety is found to
be animus, a law that discriminates against religion based on unsubstantiated
fear [in Trump v. Hawaii] should also be struck down for animus.”150 Other
researchers have similarly exposed incongruencies in how courts employ the
animus doctrine and to what degree they consider animus in making their
decisions.151
Although the animus doctrine has been established in Equal Protection cases
concerning racial classifications, the doctrine is being inconsistently applied as
courts struggle to balance the principles of equality law with issues such as
national security, deference to the executive, and the identity of the person
making the biased statements.152 Public officials’ explicit statements of bias and
hate were perhaps rare historically,153 but they are becoming more common.154
As will be shown below, a new approach for dealing with these issues is
necessary—particularly in the immigration law context where issues of national
security are frequently invoked to curtail consideration of external evidence of
bias.155
B. Evidence Law, Extrinsic Evidence, and the Administrative Record
The issue of which evidence of animus or bias to consider is intimately
related to the rules of evidence law concerning whether evidence is permitted
for consideration by the trier of fact or dismissed as “extrinsic.” An examination
of these rules suggests that current practices do not always secure a consistent
or logical result.
150

Id. at 158–59.
See Daniel Mach, The Supreme Court Cares About Religious Animus—Except When It Doesn’t, ACLU
(June 26, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/supreme-court-cares-about-religious-animusexcept-when-it-doesnt.
152
Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2017)
(considering state commissioners’ statements of animus in a First Amendment challenge to a civil rights
commission’s order holding a violation of state law), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018)
(ignoring the President’s statements of animus in a First Amendment challenge to an immigration executive
order).
153
See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Municipal officials acting in
their official capacities seldom, if ever, announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular course of
action because of their desire to discriminate against a racial minority.”).
154
See, e.g., Sanam Malik, When Public Figures Normalize Hate, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 25,
2016, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2016/03/25/134070/when-public-figuresnormalize-hate/; Kevin Quealy, The Complete List of Trump’s Twitter Insults (2015–2021), N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/19/upshot/trump-complete-insult-list.html.
155
See infra Part III.
151
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The purpose of evidence law, as stated in the Federal Rules of Evidence, is
“to administer every proceeding fairly” with the goal of “ascertaining the truth
and securing a just determination.”156 Out of concerns about practicality,
efficiency, and integrity, only certain types of evidence are considered by
courts.157 For example, the rules of hearsay do not permit the admission of outof-court statements if they are offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,”
unless an exception applies.158 Furthermore, the best evidence doctrine generally
requires an original writing or recording to prove its contents instead of proof by
testimonial description.159 Evidence law is also concerned with avoiding certain
biases of jurors used during trial.160 These rules focus on admitting the most
credible and reliable evidence to preserve the accuracy and integrity of judicial
decisions.
The term “extrinsic evidence” refers to “all evidence relating to some fact or
question that arises indirectly” and that “sheds light on a matter from a source
other than the matter itself.”161 Examples of extrinsic evidence include
legislative history as evidence for legislation and parole evidence in contracts
cases.162 To understand written documents, extrinsic evidence may be used to
prove a meaning if such a meaning is “reasonably susceptible.”163 In other
matters, extrinsic evidence is generally not considered for the same reasons of
reliability and credibility.164
The rules of extrinsic evidence also apply in administrative law cases. When
courts review agency conduct that takes the form of an adjudication, courts
sometimes consider “outside statements” to disqualify such agency action.165
However, when reviewing legislative history, courts generally do not consider
extrinsic or “extra-textual evidence” if the text is clear.166

156

FED. R. EVID. 102.
See FED. R. EVID. 801, 802, 1002.
158
FED. R. EVID. 801, 802.
159
FED. R. EVID. 1002 (“An original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove its
content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.”).
160
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror makes a clear statement
[indicating reliance] on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment
requires that the no-impeachment rule give way . . . to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s
statement.”).
161
Extrinsic Evidence, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (2012).
162
Id.
163
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968).
164
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.”).
165
Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1337, 1365 (2019).
166
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2412 (2018).
157
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When referring to public statements of animus that undermine an
immigration policy’s constitutionality, different terminology should be used.
The term “extrinsic evidence”—which categorizes the evidence as remote,167
and
beyond
consideration—does
not
capture
the
indirect,168
contemporaneous,169 overt,170 or public171 nature of such statements.
Furthermore, legal scholars have argued that when the President makes public
statements, courts may appropriately rely on and consider those statements in
certain situations.172 As will be discussed below, courts have considered public
statements by the President and by other high-ranking government officials.173
Therefore, although this Comment uses the term “extrinsic evidence” out of
convenience, the term does not adequately characterize the compelling, explicit
statements of bias that courts often consider in determining impermissible
animus in immigration cases.
III. WHEN COURTS LOOKED BEYOND TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
When courts apply the rules and doctrines related to extrinsic evidence and
animus to cases at hand, the results vary considerably. Existing case law paints
a conflicting picture of when courts consider or ignore extrinsic evidence in
various constitutional and administrative contexts related to immigration. Not
only is there variation in results among foundational cases from the twentieth
century but, as will be shown below, the juxtaposition of foundational and
Trump Administration cases suggests that courts struggle to consistently deal
with evaluating extrinsic evidence in immigration cases. Consequently, courts
would benefit from a new test to apply uniformly to determine whether to
consider explicit statements of bias in immigration cases.

167
See DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (explaining extrinsic evidence
of former President Trump’s statements as “remote in time and made in unrelated contexts”).
168
Sheppard, supra note 161.
169
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977).
170
See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, DHS v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (describing such evidence as “overt expressions of prejudice”).
171
See Clarke, supra note 130, at 553.
172
See generally Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 71 (2017) (arguing that judicial reliance on presidential speech is appropriate when such speech clearly
manifests an intent to enter the legal sphere and in cases concerning national security); Shawn E. Fields, Is It
Bad Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 273 (2018)
(proposing a flexible and fact-specific approach to determining when courts should consider campaign
statements in discerning discriminatory intent); Michael Coenen, Campaign Communications and the Problem
of Government Motive, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 333, 337–38 (2018) (suggesting an “inclusionary approach” that
would consider campaign communications in judicial determinations of illicit motivations).
173
See infra Part III.

GALVEZ_10.5.21

2021]

10/5/2021 10:16 AM

BIAS AND IMMIGRATION

79

A. Foundational Cases
In three foundational immigration cases—Kleindienst v. Mandel,174 Fiallo
v. Bell,175 and Kerry v. Din176—the Supreme Court discussed the importance of
judicial deference toward the executive and legislative branches’ exercise of
their immigration power in decisions to admit foreign nationals into the United
States. The Court in these three immigration admission cases elaborated on the
“facially legitimate and bona fide” requirement, whereby further judicial inquiry
into constitutional issues and extrinsic evidence was not necessary if the statute
or decision at issue was legitimate on its face.177
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, a Marxist professional journalist from Belgium
applied for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States to participate in an
academic conference, but the Department of State denied his application and
found him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(28).178 Six U.S. citizens filed
suit arguing the denial deprived them of their First and Fifth Amendment rights
to hear and meet with the journalist at the conference.179 They argued that the
application of the statute was “arbitrary and capricious” and that denying
“leftist” scholars but admitting “rightist” scholars denied them equal
protection.180 The Court rejected their claims and instead held the following:
[W]hen the Executive [Branch] exercises this power [to exclude an
alien] on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test
it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests
of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.181

In reaching its decision, the Court repeatedly cited judicial deference to the
political branches in matters of admission of foreign nationals and national
security.182 The Court noted that “the power to exclude aliens is inherent in
sovereignty, necessary for . . . defending the county against foreign
encroachment and dangers.”183 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the
“plenary congressional power” to exclude foreign nationals was “firmly
174

408 U.S. 753 (1972).
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
176
576 U.S. 86 (2015).
177
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770; see Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794–95; Din, 576 U.S. at 103–04 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
178
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–59.
179
Id. at 759–60.
180
Id. at 760.
181
Id. at 770.
182
Id. at 764–70.
183
Id. at 765 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
175
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established” as a power of the executive.184 As a result of the interest in
sovereignty and judicial deference to the political branches, the Court reversed
the decision and ruled against the U.S. citizens’ constitutional claims.185
However, in his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall criticized the Court’s
“facially legitimate” standard as “unusual” and lacking any precedent or
justification.186
A few years later, the Supreme Court heard another case concerning the
admission of foreign nationals into the United States: Fiallo v. Bell.187 Three sets
of unwed natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock filed suit,
arguing that the statutory definitions of “child” and “parent” in the INA of 1952
were unconstitutional violations of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.188
The INA of 1952 granted special preference immigration status to the children
and parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, but the statute only
included preference to the children born out of wedlock seeking admission
through their natural mothers, not through their natural fathers.189 Thus, the
fathers and children argued that the statute denied them equal protection because
it discriminated against them “on the basis of the father’s marital status, the
illegitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent.”190 The Court again followed
a “limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”191 and left the
“policy question” of the statute’s distinctions for the political branches.192 The
Court ruled in favor of the government, holding that “the power to expel or
exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”193
Following its holding from Mandel, the Court did not consider the “doublebarreled discrimination” in this case because the sovereign power to admit or
exclude foreign nationals was a “legitimate and bona fide reason” requiring no
further investigation.194
184

Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 770.
186
Id. at 777–78 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Merely ‘legitimate’ governmental interests cannot override
constitutional rights. Moreover, the majority demands only ‘facial’ legitimacy and good faith, by which it means
that this Court will never ‘look behind’ any reason the Attorney General gives. No citation is given for this kind
of unprecedented deference to the Executive.”).
187
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
188
Id. at 790–91; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D), (2) (2020)).
189
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788–89.
190
Id. at 791.
191
Id. at 792.
192
Id. at 798.
193
Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
194
Id. at 794–95 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185
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In the more recent case of Kerry v. Din, the Supreme Court revisited the
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” requirement.195 A naturalized citizen
and resident of the United States alleged that the government had violated due
process by denying her husband’s visa application without providing an
adequate explanation.196 The Court followed Fiallo v. Bell and did not interfere
with immigration “policy questions” best left for Congress.197 In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy concluded that, particularly in the area of national
security, courts should defer to the executive branch’s “substantial discretion”
to exclude foreign nationals.198 The only way a court would “look behind” the
challenged action would be if the plaintiff made an “affirmative showing of bad
faith” that was “plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity.”199
These three cases constitute one precedent whereby the Supreme Court does
not look beyond a facially legitimate reason for admitting or excluding foreign
nationals and instead defers to national security. However, as discussed below,
the Court has established another competing line of precedent.
B. Cases in Which the Supreme Court Looked Beyond
Although the Supreme Court in these three foundational cases adhered to the
“facially legitimate and bona fide” requirement when presented with a
challenged decision to exclude a foreign national, in other cases the Court has
looked beyond the challenged decision to consider constitutional challenges and
extrinsic evidence. These other decisions represent compelling precedent and
guidance for courts to consider additional evidence of bias or other motives in
certain immigration cases concerning admission, exclusion, and national
security.
One early example where the Court went beyond the face of the decision and
considered extrinsic evidence of biased statements was the case United States
ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy.200 In Shaughnessy, a foreign national applied for
habeas corpus after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied his

195

Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015).
Id. at 88.
197
Id. at 97 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 798).
198
Id. at 104 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The plurality also concluded that the United States citizen did not
have a protected liberty interest in her marriage that entitled her to seek judicial review of a consular officer’s
denial of her husband’s visa application. Id. at 93–97 (plurality opinion).
199
Id. at 105 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
200
347 U.S. 260 (1954), superseded by statute, Immigration and Nationality Act, § 106, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105(a) (1961), as recognized in LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 1998) (the statute changed the
method of judicial review of deportation orders from habeas corpus to declaratory judgment actions).
196
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application for suspension of his deportation order.201 The foreign national
claimed that prior to the BIA’s decision, the Attorney General had announced at
a press conference that he intended to deport certain “unsavory characters”
included on a confidential list of 100 individuals’ names, including the foreign
national’s name.202 The foreign national argued that the circulation of the list at
the BIA and the Department of Justice made the BIA’s “fair consideration” of
his case impossible.203 The Court held that the BIA failed to exercise its
discretion because the Attorney General was “dictating the [BIA’s] decision” in
violation of the existing regulations requiring due process.204 Therefore, the
foreign national was entitled to a hearing to try to prove his allegations,205
against the dissent’s proposal for judicial deference to the Attorney General.206
Although the Court in Shaughnessy looked beyond at the Attorney General’s
public statements at the press conference, the Court did not elaborate on how
courts should determine whether to consider certain extrinsic evidence in
administrative cases.207 Other courts have similarly considered the Attorney
General’s statements as extrinsic evidence.208
Two decades later, the Supreme Court filled in the gap by articulating nonexhaustive factors that courts should consider when going beyond and assessing
discriminatory purpose in Fourteenth Amendment cases.209 In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a
nonprofit development corporation challenged a village’s denial of its request
for rezoning from a single- to multiple-family classification, arguing that the
denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.210
To have an equal protection violation, proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required because discriminatory impact alone is not determinative.211
The discriminatory purpose does not need to be the “dominant” or “primary”
201

Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 264.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 267–68.
205
Id. at 268.
206
Id. at 269, 271 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Congress vested in the Attorney General, and in him alone,
discretion as to whether to suspend deportation under certain circumstances. . . . We would affirm and leave the
responsibility for suspension or execution of this deportation squarely on the Attorney General, where Congress
has put it.”).
207
Id. at 268.
208
See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (2017) (considering statements by the
President and the Attorney General to grant a motion for a nationwide injunction of an executive order’s threat
to remove federal funding from sanctuary cities).
209
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
210
Id. at 254.
211
Id. at 266 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
202
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purpose of the action, but the discriminatory intent must be at least a “motivating
factor” for courts to leave behind their judicial deference.212 To evaluate whether
a defendant acted with discriminatory purpose, the Court proposed four nonexhaustive factors that courts should consider.213 These factors included (1) the
decision’s historical background, “particularly if it reveals a series of official
actions taken for invidious purposes”;214 (2) “[t]he specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision”;215 (3) the defendant’s “[d]epartures from
the normal procedural sequence”;216 and (4) the “legislative or administrative
history,” with particular focus on “contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body” such as meeting minutes or reports.217 When applying
these factors, the Court concluded that although the decision had a
discriminatory impact, a discriminatory purpose was not proven because the
official meeting minutes focused “almost exclusively” on the zoning aspects of
the request, not racial concerns.218 Although the Court in Arlington Heights
proposed the factors for a Fourteenth Amendment case concerning rezoning, the
Court has later used the same factors in other First Amendment cases219 and in
immigration-related cases concerning the Fifth Amendment.220
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,221 the Supreme Court proposed a separate test for
when to look beyond at additional external evidence in First Amendment cases.
In this case, taxpayers challenged two state statutes that provided state financial
support to nonpublic, church-related elementary and secondary schools and their
teachers, arguing that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause.222 To reach
its conclusion, the Court summarized the “cumulative criteria” of existing case
law precedent and articulated a three-step test for when the court may look
beyond the face of the challenged law or action.223 First, the government must
show that the challenged action has a “secular legislative purpose”224 that is

212

Id. at 265–66.
Id. at 266–68.
214
Id. at 267.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 268.
218
Id. at 269–71.
219
See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (applying the
Arlington Heights factors to a free exercise of religion case).
220
See, e.g., DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020) (mentioning the Arlington
Heights factors before dismissing an equal protection challenge to the rescission of the DACA program).
221
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
222
Id. at 606–07.
223
Id. at 612.
224
Id.
213
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“genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”225
Second, the challenged action’s “principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.”226 Third, the challenged action must not
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”227 Employing
these factors, the Court held the statutes were unconstitutional violations of the
First Amendment.228 The Court reasoned that although the statutes clearly stated
their intent “to enhance the quality of . . . secular education,”229 the cumulative
impact of the statutes involved excessive entanglement between government and
religion.230 The test’s analysis of intent and impact parallels the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose and effect from Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.231 Lower courts have employed this test in more recent cases
concerning the Establishment Clause in the realm of immigration law.232
In addition to these earlier cases elaborating various tests of how and when
courts should look beyond the face of a challenged law or action to consider
further evidence or external statements, the Supreme Court has, on numerous
more recent occasions, considered external statements to determine
constitutional violations.233 One of the most relevant examples of this was in the
2017 case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.234
In this case, the Court was presented with a First Amendment challenge on the
basis of freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.235 After a bakery owner
refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious
beliefs, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission found probable cause in the
couple’s anti-discrimination claim and referred the case for a formal hearing by
an administrative law judge who “ruled in the couple’s favor.”236 The
Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the administrative law
judge’s decision.237 On petition, the Court held that the Commission violated the
225

McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
227
Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax. Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
228
Id. at 661 (White, J., concurring).
229
Id. at 613 (majority).
230
Id. at 614.
231
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977) (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
232
See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated, Trump v.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
233
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
234
138 S. Ct. 1719.
235
Id. at 1723.
236
Id. at 1724–26.
237
Id. at 1726–27.
226
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bakery owner’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression of religion
because the Commission displayed a “clear and impermissible hostility”238 to
his religious beliefs, thus violating the state’s duty to not base laws on such
hostility towards religion.239
In evaluating religious neutrality to reach its decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the Supreme Court considered public, recorded statements made by
commissioners during the formal, public hearings.240 The Court discussed how
some commissioners made “inappropriate and dismissive comments” that the
bakery owner’s religious beliefs were not fully welcome in the business
community.241 The Court quoted some of the commissioners’ comments in full
in the body of the opinion242 and emphasized that none of the other
commissioners made any objection to those comments and none of the
subsequently filed briefs “disavowed” the comments.243 Consequently, the
Court reasoned that the statements “cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality
of the Commission’s adjudication of [the] case”244 and thus indicated that the
Commission violated its duty to remain not hostile to religion.245 However, in
her dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed with the weight the Court
gave to the commissioners’ statements.246 She asserted that the majority’s
analysis did not evidence hostility to a degree warranting a free exercise
violation, “nor do the comments by one or two members of one of the four
decisionmaking entities considering this case justify reversing the judgment
below.”247
Another recent case where the Supreme Court considered public statements
is Cooper v. Harris.248 Voters argued that North Carolina’s redrawing of two
congressional districts after conducting the 2010 census constituted

238

Id. at 1729.
Id. at 1731.
240
Id. at 1729–30. Although the Court mentioned that some courts disagree whether to consider statements
made by lawmakers, the Court reasoned that these comments were made in adjudicatory hearings and thus could
be considered. Id. at 1730.
241
Id. at 1729 (“One commissioner suggested that [the bakery owner] can believe ‘what he wants to
believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”).
242
Id. (“Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout
history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust[,] . . . we can list hundreds of situations where freedom
of religion has been used to justify discrimination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243
Id. at 1729–30.
244
Id. at 1730.
245
Id. at 1731.
246
Id. at 1749, 1751 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
247
Id. at 1749.
248
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
239
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“impermissible racial gerrymander[ing]” and an Equal Protection violation.249
In holding that “racial considerations predominated” the redistricting effort,250
the Court considered “[u]ncontested evidence in the record” of the comments of
the legislators in charge of the redistricting.251 The Court noted that the Senator
and Representative who led the redistricting effort “were not coy in expressing”
this impermissible goal.252 They made public statements at a Senate debate, to
redistricting committees, and to their consultant that the new district needed to
have a majority black voting age population.253 In light of “this body of
evidence,”254 the Court concluded that the redistricting effort violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.255 However, like the dissent in Masterpiece
Cakeshop,256 the dissent in Cooper v. Harris criticized the majority for
“focus[ing] almost all its attention on a few references” of bias and for “read[ing]
far too much into these references.”257
In a third recent case, Department of Commerce v. New York,258 the Supreme
Court again considered extrinsic evidence of statements of bias. In this case, the
Court considered potential violations of the Enumeration Clause, APA
requirements, and the Equal Protection Clause in the decision to reinstate a
citizenship question in the 2020 census.259 The Secretary of Commerce
announced the decision in a memo at the request of the Department of Justice.260
Although the memo invoked the need to enforce the Voting Rights Act as the
reason for adding the citizenship question,261 the Court used “extra-record
discovery” to determine that the Secretary intended to reinstate the question
since he entered office and only assumed the Voting Rights rationale “late in the
process.”262 Such an “extra-record discovery” may be warranted on “a strong
showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”263

249

Id. at 1465–66.
Id. at 1482.
251
Id. at 1468.
252
Id.
253
Id. at 1468–69.
254
Id. at 1460.
255
Id. at 1482.
256
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1748–52 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
257
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1497 (Alito, J., dissenting).
258
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
259
Id. at 2562.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 2574.
263
Id. at 2573–74 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
250
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Although the Supreme Court noted that the additional evidence in the case
should have been part of the administrative record, the Court clarified that such
“extra-record discovery” should be ordered only after the government produces
the administrative record.264 Consequently, the Court concluded that “[o]ur
review is deferential, but we are ‘not required to exhibit a naiveté from which
ordinary citizens are free.’”265 However, Justice Clarence Thomas disagreed,
arguing instead that the majority “engage[d] in an unauthorized inquiry into
evidence not properly before us”266 and consequently “reflect[ed] an
unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary agency
decisions.”267
When taken together, all these cases—older cases concerning admission of
foreign nationals and more recent cases on immigration and other issues—
exemplify how the Supreme Court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence of bias
is not unprecedented. Instead, judicial consideration of statements of bias is
well-established and has occurred frequently over the past fifty years. The
existing case law suggests that it is feasible for courts to consider extrinsic
evidence of bias or alternative motives when evaluating constitutional issues
such as Equal Protection and First Amendment claims. Furthermore, such
examinations may even be warranted in certain situations when evaluating
administrative law questions.268 The Court has articulated applicable tests to use
in such situations, including the Arlington Heights factors test269 and the Lemon
v. Kurtzman analysis.270 Consequently, it is not unprecedented for courts to
consider external statements of high-ranking officials or other government
actors, particularly when there is an alleged Equal Protection violation of a
suspect class. However, the longstanding Supreme Court precedent on
considering extrinsic evidence conflicts with the Court’s refusal to consider such
statements in challenges to former President Trump’s immigration policies. This
juxtaposition highlights the inconsistencies in Supreme Court jurisprudence and
instead suggests the need for a new approach.

264
265
266
267
268
269
270

Id. at 2574.
Id. at 2575 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Id. at 2578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2576.
See id. at 2573–74 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420).
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
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C. Trump Administration Immigration Cases
A background in the immigration policies of former President Trump is
necessary to contextualize the Supreme Court’s handling of the constitutional
challenges to those policies. The Trump Administration focused on limiting
immigration to the United States and arguably reshaped immigration more than
any other President.271 It cut legal immigration almost in half, making it more
difficult for skilled foreign workers, refugees, and asylum seekers to gain
admission to the United States.272 Wait times for applications for immigration
benefits such as green cards and naturalization increased dramatically.273 The
Trump Administration also sought to combat undocumented migration by
focusing primarily on the southern border.274 For example, the “zero tolerance”
policy275 was intended to deter future immigration276 but resulted in the
humanitarian crisis of family separation277 where hundreds of young children

271
Elliot Spagat & Sophia Tareen, Under Trump, Citizenship and Visa Agency Focuses on Fraud, PALM
BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Nov. 4, 2020, at A7.
272
Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump Immigration Policy, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2020, 2:01 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/fact-check-and-review-of-trump-immigration-policy/
?sh=3e5e5b3156c0. Even those seeking political asylum are now being turned away at the border. See Kevin
Sieff, This American Life: The Walls Close In: The People Up the Stairs, CHI. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 23, 2020)
(streamed using Stitcher) (reporting on two Nicaraguan political activists who travelled to the U.S. border to
seek asylum but were deported back to Nicaragua before they could begin their asylum case).
273
See BOUNDLESS, 2020 STATE OF NEW AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REPORT (2020), https://www.boundless.
com/research/state-of-new-american-citizenship-report/ (noting that the current processing time for citizenship
applications, ten months, has doubled what it was between 2012 and 2016, even before the COVID-19 pandemic
shut down in-person interviews and oath ceremonies).
274
The undocumented population in the United States is also comprised of those who enter the country
lawfully as nonimmigrants, such as with tourist or student visas, and overstay their visas. According to the
Department of Homeland Security, there were 676,422 “overstay events” in 2019, comprising 1.21% of
nonimmigrant admissions. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT, at
iv (2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0513_fy19-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.
pdf.
275
Sessions, supra note 4 (“I have put in place a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for illegal entry on our Southwest
border. If you cross this border unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple.”).
276
See Situation Room: Full Interview with DHS Secretary John Kelly (CNN television broadcast Mar. 6,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2017/03/06/john-kelly-dhs-trump-travel-ban-wiretap-tsr-intv-full.cnn;
IMMIGRATION NATION (Netflix Series 2020), https://www.netflix.com/title/80994107.
277
Among the children separated from their parents, press and watchdog reports have found signs of posttraumatic stress, feelings of abandonment, separation anxiety, and other mental health issues. See Colleen Long,
Martha Mendoza & Garance Burke, ‘I Can’t Feel My Heart:’ Children Separated from their Parents at USMexico Border Showed Increased Signs of Post-Traumatic Stress, According to Watchdog Report, FRONTLINE
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/children-separated-from-their-parents-at-us-mexicoborder-showed-increased-signs-of-post-traumatic-stress-us-report-says/.
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are still not reunited with their parents278 and hundreds of others were sent to
Mexico without their parents despite not being Mexican nationals.279
Many of the Trump Administration’s policies on immigration and other
matters originated from Presidential executive orders.280 As one notable
example, one week after he was inaugurated, former President Trump issued an
executive order titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into
the United States,” which imposed a ninety-day ban on the entry of foreign
nationals from seven Muslim-majority nations.281 The action was colloquially
referred to as the “Muslim ban” or the “travel ban.”282 This executive order was
later revised twice283 and the final version restricted the entry of foreign
nationals from five Muslim-majority nations and two other countries.284 During
the COVID-19 pandemic, he also issued executive orders under the guise of
national security that suspended the issuance of green cards to foreign nationals
abroad285 and the entry of foreign nationals with temporary employment-based
visas.286 Other major changes to immigration came from DHS, including the
decisions to end the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for various

278
Maya Yang, Parents of 337 Children Separated at Border Under Trump Still Not Found, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2021, 12:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/aug/12/migrant-childrenseparated-parents-border-trump; Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of 545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot Be
Found, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrant-children-separated.html (last updated
Mar. 15, 2021). Early in his term President Biden created a task force to try to reunify these families. Exec.
Order No. 14,011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,273 (Feb. 2, 2021).
279
Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Expels Migrant Children from Other Countries to Mexico, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/migrant-children-expulsions-mexico.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2021).
280
See Avalon Zoppo, Amanda Proença Santos & Jackson Hudgins, Here’s the Full List of Donald
Trump’s Executive Orders, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/here-s-full-list-donaldtrump-s-executive-orders-n720796 (last updated Oct. 17, 2017, 11:58 AM).
281
Exec. Order No. 13,769, supra note 4 (imposing a ban on the entry of foreign nationals from Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen for ninety days and instating a 120-day ban on the entry of refugees).
282
See, e.g., Editorial Board, President Trump’s Muslim Ban Lite, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/president-trumps-muslim-ban-lite.html; Christopher Richardson, OpEd: Two Years in, Trump’s Travel Ban is Still Ruining Lives, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019, 3:15 AM), https://www.
latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-richardson-travel-ban-20190122-story.html.
283
See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (banning the entry of foreign nationals
from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24,
2017).
284
Proclamation No. 9,645, supra note 283 (imposing entry restrictions on foreign nationals from Chad,
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen). The ban was not revoked until President Biden took
office. Proclamation No. 10,141 86 Fed. Reg. 7,005 (Jan. 20, 2021).
285
Proclamation No. 10,014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 22, 2020).
286
Proclamation No. 10,052, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,263 (June 22, 2020).
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countries,287 rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program,288 and impose a new public charge rule for green card applicants.289
In two recent decisions concerning the immigration policies of the Trump
Administration, the Supreme Court declined to consider extrinsic evidence of
bias despite the existence of multiple public statements suggesting bias and
animus.290 In both cases, the Court afforded great deference to the executive’s
power in the realm of immigration and shied away from a more involved
analysis of the former President’s public statements suggesting animus.291
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court took up the constitutionality of
former President Trump’s executive order that banned the entry of foreign
nationals from majority-Muslim countries.292 The appellees—“the state of
Hawaii, three individuals . . . and the Muslim Association of Hawaii”—argued
that the executive order violated provisions of the INA and the Establishment
Clause.293 In arguing the decision was motivated by religious animus, they relied
on various public comments former President Trump made as a then-candidate
on the campaign trail, as President-Elect, and as President.294 For example, in
December 2015 while speaking publicly on the presidential campaign, he called
for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”295
His campaign website also included a similar statement and was not removed
until well into his presidency.296 The appellees’ brief highlighted that Trump
287
E.g., Duke, Announcement on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti, supra note 4; Nielsen, El Salvador
TPS, supra note 4; Nielsen, Honduras TPS, supra note 4.
288
Duke, Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 4. The
DACA program continues to be the subject of much litigation. In December 2020, the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York ordered DHS to reinstate the DACA program and accept new applications again.
Vidal v. Wolf, No. 16-CV-4756, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228328 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2020). However, in July
2021, a Texas federal judge granted a permanent injunction and vacatur ordering DHS to stop approving new
DACA applications and ruled that the executive branch overstepped its authority by creating the program. Texas
v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00068, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133117, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021).
289
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, supra note 4. President Biden has since sought to review
this rule. Exec. Order No. 14,012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,277, 8,278 (Feb. 2, 2021).
290
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018); DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1916 (2020).
291
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409; DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891.
292
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2415; see Exec. Order No. 13,780, supra note 283.
293
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2406.
294
Brief for Respondents at 5–10, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 16-1540), 2017 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3420, at *16–22.
295
Id. at 5; see Outcry as Donald Trump Calls for US Muslim Ban (BBC News video broadcast Dec. 8,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-35036567.
296
Brief for Respondents, supra note 294, at 7–8; Christine Wang, Trump Website Takes Down Muslim
Ban Statement After Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trumpwebsite-takes-down-muslim-ban-statement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html (last updated May 8,
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“complained as early as July 2015 that ‘Islamic’ refugees from Syria were being
admitted to the United States, but ‘Christian’ refugees were not.”297
Furthermore, on a televised interview after the executive order was issued, one
of his advisors explained that “when [Trump] first announced it, he said,
‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me
the right way to do it legally.’”298 In light of this evidence, the appellees argued
that the executive order “carr[ied] out the Muslim ban [Trump] promised” in
violation of statute and the First Amendment.299
However, the Court held the executive order survived rational basis
scrutiny300 because it was not “inexplicable by anything but animus.”301
Following the Mandel test, the Court reasoned that the executive order had a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason”302 based on national security.303
Consequently, the Court concluded that, “[g]iven the clarity of the text, [it] need
not consider such extra-textual evidence” and thus did not analyze former
President Trump’s statements.304 The Court further noted that it “may consider
plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so long as it can
reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of
unconstitutional grounds.”305 In dismissing Trump’s public statements, the
majority concluded the following:
[T]he issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is
instead the significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential
directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of
executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not only the
statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the
Presidency itself.306

2017, 3:16 PM).
297
Brief for Respondents, supra note 294, at 5.
298
Id. at 7.
299
Id. at 11–14.
300
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
301
Id. at 2420–21.
302
Id. at 2419 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972)).
303
Id. at 2422 (reasoning that the executive order had a legitimate national security interest because three
Muslim-majority nations had been removed from the list of countries since the executive order was first issued,
the executive order “includ[ed] significant exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals,” and the
executive order included a waiver program).
304
Id. at 2412; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously
Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J. F. 641, 652 (2019) (“The Hawaii majority tried to grapple
with the extrinsic evidence, but did not engage with everything Trump said—it merely recited a select few
examples.”).
305
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.
306
Id. at 2418.

GALVEZ_10.5.21

92

10/5/2021 10:16 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:57

However, in her dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued against this deference,
maintaining that the executive order “masquerades behind a façade of nationalsecurity concerns”307 and has a “discriminatory taint.”308 Instead of the Mandel
test, Justice Sotomayor said the proper test should be whether a reasonable
observer would, in light of the full record, view the government action as enacted
for the purpose of disfavoring a religion.309 And in light of various campaign
statements, tweets, TV interview statements, and other public statements made
by former President Trump and his advisors, “a reasonable observer would
conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim animus,
rather than by the Government’s asserted national-security justifications.”310
Indeed, legal scholars have widely criticized the Court’s decision in Trump v.
Hawaii for recreating the Korematsu doctrine through “perpetuat[ing] [a] verynear-blind deference to the executive branch”311 and for perpetuating “the
epistemology of ignorance” in the law.312
The Supreme Court also heard another case, DHS v. Regents of the
University of California,313 concerning a major immigration policy change from
the Trump Administration. In 2012, DHS announced the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which provided young undocumented
individuals in the United States who came to the country as children with relief
from removal and eligibility for work authorization.314 DACA’s protections
have since been extended to almost 700,000 recipients.315 In 2017, the program
was rescinded through a memorandum316 after “the Attorney General advised
DHS to rescind [it].”317 The rescission was challenged as “arbitrary and
capricious” in violation of the APA and as a violation of the equal protection

307

Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2438.
309
Id. at 2433.
310
Id. at 2438.
311
Katyal, supra note 304, at 642.
312
George Martinez, Law, Race, and Epistemology of Ignorance, 17 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
507, 533 (2020) (“[T]he Court [in Trump v. Hawaii], in essence, ignored the strong evidence that the
Proclamation was primarily the result of prejudice against Muslims. The use of the rational basis scrutiny allows
the Court to, in essence, set aside the discriminatory statements against Muslims.”).
313
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
314
Press Release, Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Announcement of Deferred Action
Process for Young People Who are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-young-peoplewho-are-low.
315
DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901.
316
Duke, Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, supra note 4.
317
DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901.
308
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guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.318 The plurality
decided that DHS’s rescission of the program was “arbitrary and capricious”
because the Acting DHS Secretary offered no reasons for terminating the policy,
failed to consider alternatives, and “failed to address whether there was
‘legitimate reliance’ on the [2012] DACA Memorandum.”319
While most of the plurality opinion focused on the APA claim, six
paragraphs at the end were devoted to the Equal Protection claim.320 As if as an
afterthought, the plurality rejected the Equal Protection challenge, stating that
the appellants “fail[ed] to raise a plausible inference that the rescission was
motivated by animus.”321 Using the Arlington Heights factors test, the Court
found no disparate impact and no unusual history in the DACA rescission.322
The Court reasoned that because Latinxs make up a large part of the
undocumented immigrant population, if the Court were to accept the Equal
Protection claim, then any “generally applicable immigration policy” could be
so challenged.323 The plurality also quickly dismissed former President Trump’s
statements as “unilluminating,”324 “remote in time and made in unrelated
contexts,”325 and not probative contemporary statements.326
However, like in Trump v. Hawaii, the plurality opinion failed to thoroughly
discuss or analyze Trump’s statements that were presented as evidence of bias
and improper animus.327 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained that it was
“unwarranted on the existing record and premature at this stage of the litigation”
for the plurality to “foreclose[]” any equal protection challenge.328 She criticized
the plurality for not considering Trump’s statements that were cataloged in the
appellants’ briefs and in the lower courts’ decisions.329 These statements
included remarks made before and after former President Trump assumed office,
such as his comment that Mexican immigrants are “people that have lots of
problems,” “the bad ones,” and “criminals, drug dealers, [and] rapists,” as well

318

Id. at 1903.
Id. at 1912–13 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
320
Id. at 1915–16.
321
Id. at 1916.
322
Id. at 1915–16; see also Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2020) (using the Arlington
Heights factors test to reject the claim that racial animus was behind the decision to end TPS).
323
DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16.
324
Id. at 1916.
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id. at 1915–16.
328
Id. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
329
Id.
319
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as his statement comparing undocumented immigrants to “animals.”330 Justice
Sotomayor also argued the DACA rescission was similar to the executive order
in Trump v. Hawaii because the action “was an outgrowth of the [former]
President’s campaign statements about Muslims.”331 Because the appellants’
Equal Protection claim survived the pleading threshold, Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent proposed permitting the appellants to develop it on remand.332
In these two immigration cases, the Supreme Court demonstrated its
hesitation to analyze former President Trump’s public statements of bias. This
blind deference to national security in the face of explicit statements of bias
contrasts greatly with the approach taken by lower courts.
D. Lower Courts’ Approaches
Although the Supreme Court shied away from considering former President
Trump’s statements in Trump v. Hawaii and DHS v. Regents of the University
of California, lower courts have grappled with his public comments that
demonstrated animus and bias, instead of dismissing them behind the guise of
national security.333 Although many of the cases have since been reversed or
vacated by the Supreme Court, they offer alternative examples of how courts
can more properly engage with high-ranking government officials’ public
statements of bias in constitutional challenges to immigration policies.334
First, in a lower court’s evaluation of an Equal Protection challenge to
DHS’s decision to rescind the DACA program, the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York considered former President Trump’s statements to
determine that the allegations of racial animus were sufficiently pleaded to
survive a motion to dismiss.335 The court articulated that the plaintiffs had to
show a discriminatory effect336 and that an “invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor” in the decision.337 To prove discriminatory intent, the
330
Id. (citing Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 276–77 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, DHS v. Regents, 140
S. Ct. 1891); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DHS, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
331
DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
332
Id.
333
See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 274, rev’d, DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891; Ramos v. Nielsen,
336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020); Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
334
See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, rev’d, DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891; Ramos v. Nielsen,
336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, rev’d, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
554, vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353.
335
Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 274.
336
Id.
337
Id. at 276 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
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court noted that that “litigants may make ‘a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.’”338 The court
reviewed former President Trump’s “disheartening number of statements”339
made along the campaign trail, including his comments that Mexican
immigrants are “criminals, drug dealers, [and] rapists” and that Latinx
immigrants are “animals” and “bad hombres.”340 Because this case was decided
at the pleading stage, the court concluded that the allegations were “sufficiently
racially charged, recurring, and troubling” enough to raise a plausible inference
of discriminatory animus.341 Consequently, the court concluded that “[p]laintiffs
have alleged sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that the DACA
rescission was substantially motivated by unlawful discriminatory purpose.”342
Notably, the court declared that it should not “bury its head in the sand when
faced with overt expressions of prejudice.”343
Another example where a lower court grappled with the former President’s
public statements of bias was in Ramos v. Nielsen.344 In a challenge to DHS’s
termination of the TPS designation for four countries—El Salvador, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and Sudan—the District Court of the Northern District of California
granted a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs showed a “substantial
record supporting their claim” that the decision violated the APA and Equal
Protection.345 The court considered former President Trump’s statements and
even listed seven examples in the opinion.346 Beyond direct evidence of animus,
the court also noted the existence of circumstantial evidence of race being a
motivating factor in the decision.347 In light of the statements, the court
concluded that Trump “expressed animus against non-white, non-European
immigrants” and such animus may have influenced the DHS Secretary’s
decision to rescind the TPS designation.348
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly reviewed
statements by the former President in an early challenge to the executive order

338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347

Id. at 276 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 276–77; see supra note 330 and accompanying text.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 278.
336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1080–81.
Id. at 1100–01.
Id. at 1101 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67

(1977)).
348

Id. at 1098.
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that banned travel from various majority-Muslim countries.349 In International
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, lawful permanent residents sought to
enjoin the enforcement of the executive order arguing they suffered an injury
because they had family members seeking entry into the county and arguing a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.350 Following the
precedents from Kerry v. Din and Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court articulated that
if the plaintiff “makes an affirmative showing of bad faith that is plausibly
alleged with sufficient particularity,” then the court may “look behind the
challenged action to assess its facially legitimate justification.”351 Regarding
Trump’s campaign and other public statements demonstrating bias,352 the court
rigorously examined the statements and called them “direct, specific evidence”
of motivation353 and “readily discoverable fact[s].”354 Because these comments
were “explicit statements of purpose,” the court noted that “[w]e need not probe
anyone’s heart of hearts to discover the purpose of [the executive order].”355
After such review, the court decided to “look behind” the executive order
because the comments plausibly alleged animus.356 However, the court held that
the first prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test failed because the primary purpose
of the executive order was religious animus.357 In so holding, the court declared
that “the political branches’ power over immigration is not tantamount to a
constitutional blank check, and . . . vigorous judicial review is required when an
immigration action’s constitutionality is in question.”358
Each of these three lower court decisions provides a lens into how courts can
grapple with problematic public statements of animus coming from the President
and other high-ranking public officials.359 The stark contrast between how lower
courts and the Supreme Court have treated these statements in evaluating
constitutional challenges to immigration policies suggests that the existing tests
need revision. Instead, courts could benefit from more explicit guidance in how
to balance the constitutional issues with the historical trend of the judiciary’s
349
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S.
Ct. 353 (2017).
350
Id. at 577–78.
351
Id. at 590–91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 105 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
352
See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
353
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 595.
354
Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
355
Id. at 595.
356
Id. at 592 (quoting Din, 576 U.S. at 105 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
357
Id. at 594.
358
Id. at 590.
359
Although all these decisions were later reversed or vacated by the Supreme Court, the Court did not
directly address the issue of extrinsic evidence or explicit statements of bias in reaching its decisions.
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deference to the executive branch in matters of immigration and national
security.
IV. A NEW TEST FOR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN
IMMIGRATION CASES
A. Shying Away from Extrinsic Evidence
A review of the Supreme Court’s decisions on constitutional challenges to
immigration policies demonstrates that although there are two competing
precedents, the precedent to consider such extrinsic evidence is more
compelling. The first precedent—the facially legitimate or bona fide reason
requirement—led the Court not to consider extrinsic evidence in cases
concerning admission of foreign nationals.360 Under the second precedent,
however, the Court considered the biased statements of the decisionmakers
behind the challenged actions—including the Attorney General,361 state
legislators,362 and the Secretary of Commerce.363 In the context of immigration
policies whose constitutionality is challenged because of the promulgator’s
discriminatory rhetoric and animus, the second line of precedent is more
compelling because it recognizes the speaker’s key role in the promulgation of
the challenged policies. Consideration of this link between speaker and policy is
important in the immigration context because the executive’s immigration
power receives broad deference and is inextricably connected to the fundamental
concept of sovereignty.364 Furthermore, the first precedent is distinguishable
from this context because that line of cases concerned the admission of foreign
nationals located geographically outside the country and did not include
allegations of discriminatory bias or animus.365
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court sheepishly shied away from
considering the then-President’s public discriminatory statements in contrast to
compelling precedent. In both Trump v. Hawaii and DHS v. Regents of the
University of California, the Supreme Court failed to consider former President
Trump’s public statements of animus and even failed to discuss at length any

360

See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Din, 576 U.S. 86.
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 261–62, 264 (1954).
362
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468–69 (2017).
363
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019).
364
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893).
365
See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–59; Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 790 n.3; Din, 576 U.S. at 88.
361
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specific example of his biased statements.366 In Trump v. Hawaii, a blind
deference to the interest of national security and to the power of the Presidency
resulted in the Court’s failure to recognize the former President’s explicit public
statements of bias that would undermine the constitutionality of the travel ban.367
In DHS v. Regents of the University of California, the Court’s concern for setting
a precedent on the disparate impact ground, while ignoring compelling evidence
to preliminarily dismiss a claim,368 suggests the existing tests for looking beyond
at extrinsic evidence of bias are imperfect.
However, the absence of substantive analysis of extrinsic evidence of bias
in Trump v. Hawaii and DHS v. Regents of the University of California contrasts
greatly with the Supreme Court’s approach in other pivotal cases decided since
2017369 as well as with lower courts’ approaches.370 Notably, the Court varies
considerably in how much of its opinion it devotes to discussion of the extrinsic
evidence of biased comments, ranging from discussing the statements at length
to not even referencing the statements in a footnote.371 Furthermore, the Court
inconsistently treats such statements when considering how public the
statements are. For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court considered the
statements made by a couple of commissioners at public hearings in the state of
Colorado.372 If the Court will analyze a few statements that were made publicly
on a local level, then it should follow that the Court would likewise consider
statements made publicly on a national level—on presidential campaigns,
Twitter, and nationally broadcasted television. Similarly, the identity of the
speaker—including their job title and scope of public recognition—should affect
the extent of the Court’s concern with their statements. Although in other cases
the Court analyzed biased statements made by state legislators in charge of

366
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2412–17 (2018); DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020); see also Katyal, supra note 304, at 652 (explaining that the Court in Trump v. Hawaii
“did not engage with” and “did not even cite” former President Trump’s problematic statements).
367
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422, 2418.
368
See DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915–16.
369
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Cooper v. Harris, 137
S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
370
See Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct.
1891; Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir.
2020); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacating as moot 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017).
371
Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30 (devoting five paragraphs to reviewing the
commissioners’ comments made at public formal hearings), and Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574–76 (devoting
eleven paragraphs to discussing the Secretary’s statements of bias), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417
(briefly summarizing a few of the President’s comments in two paragraphs), and DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at
1915–16 (devoting only six paragraphs to discuss and dismiss the entire Equal Protection claim).
372
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
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redistricting373 and made by the Secretary of Commerce,374 the Court in Trump
v. Hawaii failed to consider statements made by the nation’s chief executive who
has much broader public recognition.375
Another point that illustrates the Supreme Court’s disparate treatment of
statements of bias and animus is the great variation in terminology the Court
used to refer to these statements. When the Court considered such statements in
its analysis, it described them with neutral terms—“comments,”376
“[u]ncontested evidence,”377 “body of evidence,”378 and “the evidence”379—
suggesting a normalization of the judicial examination of biased statements.
Lower courts sometimes went even further and used explicit terms such as “overt
expressions of prejudice,”380 “circumstantial and direct evidence,”381 “direct,
specific evidence,”382 “readily discoverable fact[s],”383 and “substantial extrinsic
evidence.”384 However, when the Court chose to ignore the proffered statements,
the Court used terminology that distanced the statements as irrelevant, including
terms such as “extrinsic evidence,”385 “extra-textual evidence,”386 “remote in
time and made in unrelated contexts,”387 “cited statements,”388 and “additional
factual details.”389 Even on a lexical level, courts are split over how to consider
overt statements of bias in constitutional challenges.
Although the Supreme Court has established analytical frameworks to apply
in certain constitutional challenges—including the Arlington Heights holistic
factors test390 for Fourteenth Amendment challenges and the Lemon v. Kurtzman

373

Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468–69.
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574.
375
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.
376
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1721.
377
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468.
378
Id. at 1469.
379
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575.
380
Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
381
Id. at 276 (citation omitted).
382
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 595 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 353
(2017).
383
Id. (quoting McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005)).
384
Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d, Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872
(9th Cir. 2020).
385
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
386
Id. at 2412.
387
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020).
388
Id.
389
Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 105 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
390
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
374
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test391 for Establishment Clause challenges—the Court’s conflicting approaches
illustrate that the tests are inadequate to scrutinize high-ranking government
officials’ openly discriminatory speech. In this way, former President Trump’s
openly discriminatory rhetoric exposed a weakness in the ability of existing tests
to effectively and consistently consider evidence of animus in challenges to
immigration policies.
Given the strong disparities between the Supreme Court’s inconsistent
approaches to considering explicit statements of bias and animus in these cases,
courts would benefit from a new factors test that is specifically tailored to the
area of immigration law. Because the Court should not extrapolate too much
from “a few references” of animus,392 any new test must consider the weight of
the statements in comparison to the rest of the evidence available on the record.
In a post-Trump world where unbridled political rhetoric has become
normalized,393 a new, clearer test is critical to assist courts in dealing with a highranking public official’s statements of bias in constitutional challenges to
immigration policies and decisions.
B. A New Balancing Test
To provide courts with additional guidance394 in determining how much
weight to give to extrinsic evidence of biased statements in constitutional and
administrative cases concerning immigration law, this Comment proposes a new
test comprised of five factors: (1) the identity of the speaker, (2) the temporal
proximity between the biased statement and the challenged government action,
(3) the scope of the statement’s entry in the public sphere, (4) the frequency of
the statements, and (5) whether a reasonable observer would view the
government action as enacted because of animus toward a particular protected
class. These factors are designed to help courts maintain a certain degree of
deference to the issue of national security without categorically excluding
compelling evidence of bias that undermines the constitutionality of the
immigration law at issue.

391

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1497 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1749–51 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
weight given by the majority to “the comments by one or two members of one of the four decisionmaking
entities” involved in the case).
393
See Malik, supra note 154; Tal Orian Harel, Jessica Katz Jameson & Ifat Maoz, The Normalization of
Hatred: Identity, Affective Polarization, and Dehumanization on Facebook in the Context of Intractable Political
Conflict, SOC. MEDIA + SOC’Y, Apr.–June 2020, at 1.
394
These factors are intended to supplement the factors delineated in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252.
392
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First, the identity of the speaker who made the biased statements is relevant
both in terms of rank in the government and proximity to the government agency
or office that enacted the contested action. High-ranking public officials such as
the Attorney General,395 state legislators,396 the Secretary of Commerce,397 and
certainly the President398 are prominent public figures with expertise whose
statements should be taken seriously. Furthermore, courts should more readily
consider statements made by government officials that had either the authority
to take the action or direct involvement with its enactment because of the
apparent nexus between the statements and the challenged action.399
Second, a close temporal proximity between the biased statements and the
challenged action suggests that courts should consider the statements. The
decisionmakers’ contemporaneous statements,400 not those distant in time from
the action at issue,401 should be more readily analyzed. However, remoteness
alone should not disqualify the statement from judicial consideration when the
other factors outweigh the lack of contemporaneousness.402
Third, courts should hesitate to ignore statements that have a large scope of
public existence. Statements made in a public forum403 by high-ranking
government decisionmakers should be more readily considered because of the
broad public awareness and recognition. Although public recognition on a

395
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 261–62 (1954); County of Santa Clara
v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 520 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
396
See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468–69.
397
See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019).
398
See Shaw, supra note 172, at 133 (“The President’s utterances often represent the purest embodiment
of politics.”).
399
See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468–69 (considering statements made by the “State’s mapmakers” to
determine the legislators engaged in race-based redistricting).
400
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (“The
legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements
by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of meetings, or reports.”).
401
See DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 (2020) (finding the President’s
statements about the Latinx community “unilluminating” because they were “remote in time and made in
unrelated contexts”); Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 898 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e find it instructive that these
statements occurred primarily in contexts removed from and unrelated to TPS policy or decisions.”).
402
For example, legal scholars have argued that courts should not be categorically barred from considering
campaign speech in determining discriminatory intent in later government actions and instead the analysis should
be fact-specific and follow other principles of evidence. See Fields, supra note 172, at 276; Coenen, supra note
172, at 338–39.
403
Televised appearances, interviews, campaign statements, and public briefings are examples of
statements made in public forums. Public forums include online social media platforms such as Twitter because
of the degree of interactivity between users. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302
F. Supp. 3d, 541, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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national scale should carry more weight than on a local scale,404 private
comments should not be excluded solely because they were not made in public.
Fourth, higher frequency of biased statements may indicate a stronger
invidious purpose.405 For example, given the President’s multitude of
disparaging and biased statements about Muslims made throughout his
campaign and presidency,406 courts should not hastily deem them irrelevant of
analysis. Nevertheless, courts should avoid over-extrapolating from a few
examples of animus.407
Fifth, following Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, if a
reasonable observer, in light of the full record, would view the government
action as enacted for the purpose of disfavoring a certain protected class, the
statements suggest a strong discriminatory purpose.408 Instead of shying away
from inconvenient, discriminatory rhetoric, the court cannot be naïve409 or “bury
its head in the sand”410 and instead must grapple with the compelling evidence
of bias.
Overall, high-ranking government decisionmakers’ frequent, public
statements that a reasonable observer would consider to be discriminatory must
be properly considered by courts in immigration cases. In cases concerning
constitutional issues, such as Equal Protection and the First Amendment, the
threshold for courts to consider external statements of bias should be lower
because of the heightened scrutiny and concern for invidious discrimination
from the highest levels of government. Because no one factor is determinative,
courts must complete a thorough analysis of each factor to determine how much
weight and credibility to give to the evidence. If all factors weigh strongly in
favor of considering the evidence, courts should not invoke a blind deference to
national security but instead must critically examine the law’s constitutionality
in light of such evidence.

404
If the Court considered statements made by state commissioners in a local public hearing in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729–30 (2018), then the Court should
certainly consider statements made by national figures, such as the President, on national public platforms like
the national news and Twitter.
405
See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (“The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.”).
406
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 294, at 5–10.
407
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1497 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
408
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
409
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019).
410
Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), rev’d, DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
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V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications on the Law
The new factors test assists courts with effectively handling widespread
public statements of bias stemming from the executive branch in challenges to
immigration laws. The Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled with the
issue of how much extrinsic evidence of bias to permit and tolerate in
constitutional and administrative challenges.411 Indeed, courts have shied away
from addressing the issue.412 Although legal scholars have called for an end to
legal doctrines that shield certain types of evidence of bias and animus from
judicial consideration,413 a concrete alternative test is still lacking. Therefore,
the factors test provides much needed additional guidance to maintain
consistency across judicial rulings. Additionally, going beyond and examining
extrinsic evidence of biased statements is not without precedent. Existing case
law demonstrates that examining such statements is not overly cumbersome or
infeasible because courts have been engaged in such analysis for decades.414 As
a result of the implementation of the factors test, immigration agencies and the
executive branch must provide adequate explanations for their proposed
immigration policies that are more compelling than post hoc justifications415 that
shroud discriminatory purposes.
B. Implications on Policy
The new factors test not only provides clear guidance for courts to handle
public statements of bias in immigration cases, but it also helps prevent courts
from upholding discriminatory policies under the guise of national security.
Historically, courts have afforded great deference to the executive’s immigration
411
Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (considering a
few comments made by state commissioners at local hearings), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (ignoring
statements made by the President on Twitter and on televised campaign events).
412
See Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872, 907 (9th Cir. 2020) (Christen, J., dissenting) (citing the constitutional
avoidance canon to avoid reaching the Equal Protection claim against the termination of the TPS program);
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (vacating and remanding to dismiss as moot
the challenge to the travel ban without addressing the issue of how much extrinsic evidence to consider).
413
See Clarke, supra note 130, at 511; Fields, supra note 172, at 276.
414
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Cooper v. Harris,
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551; see also Fields,
supra note 172, at 325 (“Those who claim broadly that no judge should ‘peek behind the curtain’ to determine
intent ignore forty years of precedent.”).
415
See DHS v. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1909 (concluding that “impermissible post hoc rationalizations” are
not properly before the court for consideration).
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power416 but national security has often been used to justify harsh,
discriminatory immigration policies.417 The factors test avoids such a result
because the weight of the factors indicates how much deference is appropriate.
For example, if the statements’ frequency, public scope, and
contemporaneousness are high, they suggest a strong discriminatory purpose
beyond a few isolated comments such that broad deference would not be proper.
Courts can still honor the deference to the executive’s immigration power but
only if, after considering the applicable statements, the action does not violate
the Constitution or the APA. Additionally, the factors test addresses substantial
risks. Courts’ failure to consider pervasive prejudicial rhetoric may raise a
separate issue of national security whereby bad actors become empowered418
and dangerous rhetoric becomes normalized.419 Although immigration law in the
United States has a history of exclusion and discrimination,420 such explicit
expressions of animus should not be permitted as the basis for enacting law and
policy. Deference to national security is one factor of many and should not be
blindly invoked in the presence of overt evidence of discriminatory intent.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s inability to adequately consider compelling extrinsic
evidence of bias in two challenges to the immigration policies of the Trump
Administration exposed a weakness in current analytical frameworks. Existing

416
See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kerry v. Din, 576
U.S. 86 (2015).
417
See Chacon, supra note 36, at 1832 (“The rhetoric of national security has long been used by the courts
to mask the most virulent aspects of U.S. immigration policy.”).
418
See Benjamin Newman, Jennifer L. Merolla, Sono Shah, Danielle Casarez Lemi, Loren Collingwood
& S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Trump Effect: An Experimental Investigation of the Emboldening Effect of
Racially Inflammatory Elite Communication, BRIT. J. POL. SCI., Feb. 2020, at 1, 2 (arguing that the presence of
prejudicial elite speech emboldens listeners to express their own prejudice); BRIAN LEVIN & LISA NAKASHIMA,
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE AND EXTREMISM & CAL. STATE UNIV., SAN BERNARDINO, REPORT TO THE
NATION: FACTBOOK ON HATE AND EXTREMISM IN THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONALLY 14, 34 (2019),
https://www.csusb.edu/sites/default/files/CSHE%202019%20Report%20to%20the%20Nation%20FINAL%20
7.29.19%2011%20PM_0.pdf (revealing a correlation in FBI data between political leaders’ divisive statements
and hate crimes). The dangerous power of former President Trump’s rhetoric—and its threat to national
security—was exemplified when a violent mob stormed the U.S. Capitol shortly after Trump gave an
inflammatory speech nearby declaring, “[y]ou’ll never take back our country with weakness. . . . [y]ou have to
be strong.” Aaron Rupar, How Trump’s Speech Led to the Capital Riot, VOX (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.vox.
com/22220746/trump-speech-incite-capitol-riot; see Trial Memorandum of the U.S. House of Representatives
in the Impeachment Trial of President Donald J. Trump (Feb. 2, 2021), https://judiciary.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/house_trial_brief_final.pdf (arguing that former President Trump undermined national security by
inciting an insurrection).
419
See Clarke, supra note 130, at 510.
420
See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
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factors tests are ill equipped to properly deal with overt statements of animus
from high-ranking government officials. In a post-Trump world where openly
prejudicial rhetoric is increasingly normalized, courts cannot continue to “bury
[their] head[s] in the sand”421 when confronted with explicit, public statements
of animus surrounding an immigration policy or executive action. Although
national security is a fundamental part of immigration and sovereignty,
deference to national security concerns cannot be invoked too readily in the face
of clear public statements of bias that undermine the constitutionality of the
immigration policy at issue. Otherwise, discriminatory and potentially
unconstitutional immigration policies will continue to remain the law of the land
under the façade of national security and may further legitimize discrimination.
The proposed factors test allows courts to better analyze overt statements of
bias in the context of immigration. Using this new test, courts can recognize
which statements by policy decisionmakers are pertinent to identifying
impermissible discriminatory intent. The test also helps courts weigh the
statements accordingly in constitutional and administrative challenges to
immigration laws. An objective, consistent consideration of biased statements is
critical to ensure immigration and other policies are not disguised mechanisms
to exclude on racial, religious, or ethnic lines, but rather are legitimate,
constitutional means to protect the nation’s sovereignty.
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